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Abstract
The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the
future—episodic future thought—involves the flexible (re)organization of
knowledge. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that guide
this process. The reported studies demonstrate evidence for the role of
knowledge accessibility as one such mechanism. First, comparisons were drawn
between episodic future thought and other cognitive tasks that similarly require
participants to produce open-ended responses and for which the role of
knowledge accessibility is well established. Second, three experiments (N = 270)
provided direct tests of whether accessible knowledge becomes incorporated into
episodic future thought. In Experiments 1 and 2, priming knowledge relevant to
an upcoming episode generation task shaped the content of thoughts about the
future. Experiment 3 revealed that, as with other open-ended production tasks,
primed knowledge must be processed in a meaningful manner in order for it to
exert an influence on the content of episodic future thought. These results
further understanding of episodic future thought and suggest important avenues
for future research.

x

The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the
future—episodic future thought—is currently attracting a great deal of empirical
attention in both psychology and neuroscience (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Schacter,
Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008; Szpunar, in press). Perhaps the most appealing
aspect of this emerging literature is that very little is known about the cognitive
mechanisms that underlie episodic future thought. Although a considerable
amount of research has highlighted the functional benefits of thinking about
personal future episodes (Boyer, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Taylor,
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989), not until recently have
psychologists and neuroscientists begun to ask how episodic future thought is
implemented by the human mind/brain.
As an example, consider the following scenario generated by a college
student who had been asked to think about an upcoming life event (Table 1). In
contemplating her forthcoming vacation, the participant generated a clear mental
representation of the context in which the event will take place, the people
involved, the objects that are salient in the environment, and relevant emotions.
It is apparent that one must be able to flexibly rely upon one’s existing knowledge
base in order to construct such a specific scenario (Schacter & Addis, 2007;
Szpunar, in press). Indeed, recent findings from neuroimaging (e.g., Addis,
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et al.,
2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007), neuropsychology (e.g., Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum,
Gilboa, Levin, Winocur, & Moscovitch, in press; see also Tulving, 1985), clinical
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Table 1.
A personal future episode from a sample participant
Cue: Imagine a specific event that you anticipate happening in your future
“I am on the beach in Nice. It is July, and I have just completed my senior year of college. I am
wearing a white skirt and a bright colored tank top, sitting on my old beach towel. My flip-flops
are sitting next to me. I feel the warm sun on my feet. Next to me, Kelly is asleep, basking in the
sun, with her huge summer hat over her face. Hiten and Neha are walking along the water. I
think about how they should just get it over with and hold hands, but I know they won’t. For the
most part, I am very content to just sit, feel the nice breeze, and watch the waves lap at the
shore. It’s a relaxing moment, and I realize it is one of my last before graduate school. I ignore
the nervousness building in my stomach, and I lay back and look at the few clouds in a bright blue
sky.”
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psychology (e.g., D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008), and
developmental psychology (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Atance, 2008;
Atance & O'Neill, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005) have shown that memory
plays a fundamental role in the ability to envision personal future episodes.
For instance, research from the neuroimaging literature has revealed a
striking similarity in the neural activity that characterizes episodic future thought
and the capacity to call to mind specific experiences from one’s personal past
(i.e., episodic memory) (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). This
finding has been taken as evidence that similar processes underlie the two
abilities (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis,
2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, in press). Of particular interest are posterior cortical
regions (e.g., posterior cingulate cortex, parahippocampal cortex, hippocampus)
that are known to play an important role in the retrieval of memories from one’s
past (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001; Svoboda, McKinnon, &
Levine, 2006). That episodic future thought engages these regions in a similar
manner as remembering suggests that the contents of memory may in fact be
accessed as participants think about their future. In a recent study, Szpunar,
Chan & McDermott (in press) tested whether posterior cortical regions contribute
memory-related contents to episodic future thought by manipulating the extent to
which participants were able to draw upon previous experiences when thinking
about the future. In two tasks, participants imagined personal future and past
episodes occurring in the context of familiar settings (e.g., their apartment). In a
third task, participants generated personal future episodes occurring in the
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context of unfamiliar settings (e.g., a jungle). Post-scan questionnaires ensured
that participants had no specific memories associated with the unfamiliar
settings. Regions within posteriomedial parietal cortex and the medial temporal
lobes (previously identified by Szpunar et al., 2007) were similarly engaged as
participants imagined themselves in familiar contexts. However, the same
regions exhibited relatively little neural activity as participants generated personal
future episodes in unfamiliar contexts. Hence, it appears that posterior cortical
structures associated with episodic future thought (and remembering) become
engaged to the extent that the construction of personal future episodes relies on
the bringing to mind of previous experiences.
Importantly, the above-mentioned findings have been corroborated by
research with neuropsychological patients. In particular, these studies have
shown that damage to brain regions associated with episodic memory retrieval
(e.g., medial temporal lobes) results in an accompanying deficit to the ability to
imagine personal future episodes. For instance, Hassabis et al. (2007) studied
five patients with brain damage limited to the hippocampus (a structure buried
deep in the medial temporal lobes that is thought to be particularly important for
episodic memory). Interestingly, these patients had retained their ability to know
many things about their past (e.g., names of family and friends, along with other
general knowledge) but were densely amnesic for previous experiences from
their lives. Further, these patients were markedly impaired in their ability to
imagine personal future episodes. In line with the findings presented in relation
to the neuroimaging literature, the authors suggested that both remembering and
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episodic future thought rely on intact medial temporal lobe structures (particularly
the hippocampus).
Finally, the finding that deficits of episodic future thought accompany
deficits of episodic memory has been demonstrated in a variety of patient
populations, including suicidally depressed individuals (Williams et al., 1996),
patients with schizophrenia (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2008), children under the
age of 5 years (e.g., Busby & Suddendorf, 2005), and older adults (Addis et al.,
2008). Taken together, the evidence suggests a close relationship between the
personal past and future. However, it does not specify the nature of the relation.
To date, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that guide the
process of (re)organizing information from one’s knowledge base in the course of
episodic future thought. In fact, much of this process likely occurs beyond
conscious awareness (at least when one is not specifically asked to contemplate
the process). For instance, there exists a large amount of knowledge that is
relevant to any given cue to generate a personal future episode (either in daily
life or in the laboratory). Further, the knowledge that is applicable to any such
cue may potentially be used to generate a large number of alternative scenarios
(e.g., exactly where the event will take place, who will be involved, what objects
will be salient, and so on). How is it that one specific scenario comes to mind (cf.
Table 1)?
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, a cognitive mechanism
is proposed that may reasonably be thought to guide the use of one’s knowledge
in episodic future thought. Namely, it is hypothesized that episodic future thought
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incorporates applicable knowledge that is in a relatively accessible state at the
time a specific scenario is being generated.
Second, support for this accessibility hypothesis is gained by drawing
comparisons between episodic future thought and various other cognitive tasks
that similarly require participants to generate an open-ended response to a
presented cue and for which the role of knowledge accessibility is well
established. Although episodic future thought represents a new area of scientific
inquiry, it does share links to existing lines of research, and it is likely that
significant progress in understanding episodic future thought can be made by
grounding the concept in our more developed understanding of human cognition.
Notably, these related cognitive tasks represent three ostensibly unrelated areas
of psychological research—conceptual implicit priming, impression formation,
and sentence production—that have previously shared little crosstalk.
Finally, three experiments are described that provide direct tests of
whether, and under what circumstances, accessible knowledge becomes
incorporated into episodic future thought. Briefly, the rationale behind all three
experiments is that if accessible knowledge is utilized in episodic future thought,
then manipulations that influence the accessibility of knowledge (e.g., priming)
should shape the content of participant-generated episodes. A better
understanding of the role of knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought
should provide insights into this ubiquitous mental phenomenon.

6

Accessibility Hypothesis
As was alluded to in the Introduction, the mental representation of a
personal future episode will have many potentially relevant features (i.e., various
settings, people, objects, emotions) and may result in any number of specific
arrangements of those features (i.e., scenarios). The hypothesis of this
dissertation states that currently accessible knowledge that is applicable to a
given cue to generate a personal future episode should play an important role in
determining the specific scenario that comes to mind.
Some clues for this hypothesis were garnered from an informal interview
of the sample participant mentioned earlier (Table 1). The only initial constraint
placed on the participant was to think about an upcoming life event. The
participant claimed that her planned trip to Nice was the first event that came to
mind (see Appendix A). One possibility is that this information was both
applicable to the presented cue and in a relatively accessible state (e.g., possibly
because of recent thought about similar events). Further, there were different
scenarios that the participant could have imagined in relation to her planned trip.
For instance, she could have imagined a vacation scenario that involved site
seeing rather than lying on a beach. Again, the participant reported that she
thought about the first setting that came to mind (i.e., she had recently thought
about wanting to be on a beach; see Appendix A). Indeed, it seems that the
participant was relying upon readily accessible knowledge to help her complete
the task.
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Of course, the descriptions and explanations provided by the participant
and conjectures supplied by the experimenter afford little in the way of evidence
with regard to the hypothesis that accessible information might influence the
content of episodic future thought. However, this hypothesis is certainly testable.
Importantly, support for this hypothesis may be gained from examining the role of
knowledge accessibility in the extant psychological literature involving various
other open-ended production tasks. Next, we will briefly review findings from
conceptual implicit memory, impression formation, and sentence production. In
each case, accessible (and applicable) knowledge appears to be given
precedence as participants generate open-ended responses.
The Role of Knowledge Accessibility in Open-ended Production Tasks
Conceptual Implicit Memory
Over the past 25 years, psychologists have expressed interest in the nonconscious influence of memory on task performance. Much of this research has
been conducted under the guise of implicit memory—revealed when previous
experiences facilitate performance on a task that does not require conscious
recollection of those experiences (Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter,
1987). There are two phases in the typical implicit memory experiment. First,
participants are exposed to a set of materials (e.g., a list of words, pictures, or
sentences). Second, participants complete an ostensibly unrelated task that is
actually designed to assess the extent to which information learned during the
first task (e.g., the word ‘cheetah’) facilitates performance during the second task
(e.g., complete the word fragment c h_ _ t _ _ with the first word that comes to mind;

8

answer the question ‘What is the fastest animal on the planet?’). The enhanced
performance on the second task for items related to previously studied
information relative to items unrelated to previously studied information is
referred to as priming. Information learned during the first phase may facilitate
performance during the second phase if: 1) stimuli in the two tasks share
perceptual features in common (e.g., completing the word fragment c h _ _ t _ _ as
‘cheetah’), 2) stimuli in the two tasks are conceptually related (e.g., answer
‘cheetah’ to the question ‘What is the fastest animal on the planet?’) or 3) some
combination of perceptually- and conceptually-driven processes (for a detailed
review see Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989).
Of particular interest to the topic of this dissertation are conceptual implicit
memory tasks. In the typical conceptual implicit task, participants are required to
produce an open-ended response that is meaningfully related to a presented cue
(e.g., produce an answer to a general knowledge question, generate a list of
exemplars relevant to a category cue, or generate the first word that comes to
mind in response to a cue word). As is the case with most studies of implicit
memory, the question of interest is whether participants who were previously
exposed to a critical piece of information are more likely to incorporate that
information into their response at the time of the test. Indeed, this appears to be
the case. For instance, participants are more likely to correctly answer general
knowledge questions if they were exposed to the answer in an unrelated learning
phase (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Challis & Sidhu, 1993). Similarly, participants are
more likely to incorporate a critical exemplar (typically of low frequency; e.g.,
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cheetah) during a category instance generation task (e.g., list the first 8 animals
that come to mind, McDermott & Roediger, 1996; see also Mulligan, 1997;
Rappold & Hashtroudi, 1991; Srinivas & Roediger, 1990) if they have been
previously exposed to that item.
Importantly, the extent of priming that one observes on conceptual implicit
tasks appears to be sensitive to how meaningfully the critical information was
initially processed. For instance, Blaxton (1989, Experiment 1) had participants
study a list of words under one of three orienting conditions. Some of these
critical words were presented next to an associated word (e.g., jaguar—cheetah) and
participants were asked to read the associate silently (“jaguar”) and then the
critical word aloud (“cheetah”). Other critical words were presented with no
context (e.g., XXX—cheetah) and, again, participants were asked to read the critical
word aloud. In a third condition, participants were presented with the first letter of
the critical word next to an associated word (e.g., jaguar—c___) and were asked to
generate the critical word from the cue (see also Jacoby, 1983).
Among the various tests subsequently administered by Blaxton was a
conceptual implicit memory task that required a subset of participants to answer
general knowledge questions (e.g., ‘What is the fastest animal on earth?’). Regardless of
orienting task, prior exposure to the critical words enhanced the probability that
participants came up with a correct answer to general knowledge questions
(Figure 1). However, as can be seen in Figure 1, participants were most likely to
correctly answer general knowledge questions related to the critical words they
had generated, followed by questions related to words they had read in context,
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Figure 1. Proportion general knowledge questions correct as a function of
exposure condition (data adapted from Blaxton, 1989).
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and finally questions related to words they had read with no context. This finding
was attributed to the idea that generating a critical word in relation to an
associate necessarily engages conceptual processes, while reading a critical
word without context probably does so to a lesser extent (and likely less so than
reading a critical word in context). However, since the no-context condition did
show some priming, it is likely that some meaning-based processing was
engaged by simply reading the critical words. Indeed, Srinivas and Roediger
(1990, Experiment 1) showed that disrupting conceptual processing (i.e., by
inducing structural processing of the stimulus in the exposure phase) eliminated
priming on a conceptual implicit task (they also used general knowledge
questions). This point will be rehashed in discussing the rationale behind
Experiment 3 of this dissertation.
Taken another way, the research on conceptual implicit memory
discussed above suggests that accessible (and applicable) information plays an
important role when participants are required to produce an open-ended
response that is meaningfully related to a cue. That is, information in the
participant’s knowledge base that is applicable to the task at hand and also in a
relatively accessible state (as a result of prior exposure; especially if that
exposure involved processing the critical item in a meaningful way) will influence
the semantic content of the participant’s response (see also Blaxton, 1989,
Experiment 3; Brown & Mitchell, 1994; Hamann, 1990; Mulligan, 1997). Next, we
turn to an ostensibly unrelated line of research in the social psychological
literature that has examined the role of category accessibility on impression

12

formation. As will be seen, the methods employed by researchers studying
impression formation bear a close resemblance to those employed in the implicit
memory literature. Indeed, the general pattern of empirical regularities that has
emerged from studies of conceptual implicit memory appears to hold in relevant
studies of impression formation.
Impression Formation
A considerable amount of research in the social psychological literature
has been directed towards delineating the role of category accessibility on
person perception (e.g., DeCoster & Claypool, 2004; Forster & Liberman, 2007;
Higgins, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). The basic underlying assumption of
this line of research is that people use broad conceptual categories to encode
information about behavior into memory (Bartlett, 1932; Bruner, 1957). In many
instances, however, behaviors that one observes are ambiguous and may be
interpreted in more than one way. For instance, Srull and Wyer (1979) give the
example of someone telling his girlfriend that her new hairstyle is unattractive.
This behavior could potentially be interpreted as either ‘honest’ or ‘unkind’. Srull
and Wyer (see also Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) suggest that the manner in
which ambiguous behaviors, such as the one described above, are interpreted
depends on the concepts that are currently accessible in one’s knowledge base
(cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
In their seminal study, Higgins et al. (1977) provided direct evidence for
the role of knowledge accessibility in impression formation. The study involved
two ostensibly unrelated phases. In the first phase, different groups of
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participants were exposed to various trait terms. In the second phase (presented
as a separate experiment), participants read a vignette about an unfamiliar
individual (Donald) who performed a series of ambiguous behaviors that could
either be regarded as ‘adventurous’ or ‘reckless’ (e.g., Donald thought about
crossing the Atlantic in a sailboat). The manipulation of interest was whether, in
the first phase of the experiment, participants had been exposed to trait terms
related to adventurousness or recklessness. If accessible category knowledge
(i.e., as a result of recent exposure) is used to interpret ambiguous behavior,
then participants should produce descriptions of Donald that are congruent with
the previously presented trait terms. As can be seen in Figure 2, participants
who had been exposed to adventure-related terms were more likely to describe
the ambiguous behavior positively (e.g., adventurous, brave, courageous)
whereas participants who had been exposed to reckless-related terms were
more likely to describe Donald’s behavior negatively (e.g., reckless, selfcentered, stubborn).
Several important points about the Higgins et al. (1977) experiment
deserve mention. First, the structure of the experiment (i.e., two unrelated
phases) represents the modal experimental design that is used to study
impression formation. Although the nature of the exposure phase (e.g.,
presenting individual words, presenting sentences, and so on) and the nature of
the description provided by participants in the second phase (e.g., an openended description, rating a specific trait on a Likert scale) may vary, the general
design is clearly similar to those discussed in relation to conceptual implicit
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Figure 2. Proportion of impression types generated as a function of exposure
condition (data adapted from Higgins et al., 1977).
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memory tasks. Importantly, the Higgins et al. experiment required participants to
generate a response (i.e., describe Donald’s behavior) rather than rate the
ambiguous behavior along a relevant dimension (e.g., how adventurous was
Donald?). In that sense, this experiment (along with others, e.g., Higgins, Bargh,
& Lombardi, 1985) can be considered an examination of the role of knowledge
accessibility on the production of an open-ended response (as was the case with
conceptual implicit memory tasks).
Finally, the level of priming obtained on impression formation tasks has
also been shown to depend on the extent to which the primed information is
processed in a meaningful way. Smith and Branscombe (1988) showed that
participants who had generated trait terms from conceptual cues were more likely
to show priming in their description of an ambiguous behavior than participants
who had simply read the trait terms. As discussed above, this is a consistent
feature of conceptual implicit memory tasks (see Roediger, Weldon, & Challis,
1989). Next, we will consider some converging evidence for the role of
accessible information in an open-ended sentence production task.
Sentence Production
The role of accessible (and applicable) information has also received
some attention in studies of sentence production. Bock and her colleagues (e.g.,
Bock, 1982; Bock & Irwin, 1980) have shown that the syntactical structure of
participant-generated sentences may be influenced by lexical information that is
in a temporarily accessible state (i.e., as a result of recent exposure). Although
many of these studies have focused on the reproduction of sentences from
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memory (e.g., Bock & Irwin, 1980; Perfetti & Goldman, 1975), others have
examined tasks in which production is more open-ended. For instance,
participants in one study (Bock, 1986) were asked to describe a series of pictures
depicting events involving an agent and a patient (e.g., a bee stinging a man).
Although each picture could potentially be described in a number of alternative
ways, Bock was particularly interested in two descriptions that participants
typically came up with: 1) an active sentence (e.g., “the bee is stinging the
man”), in which the agent is mentioned first and 2) its corresponding passive
(e.g., “the man is being stung by a bee”), in which the patient is mentioned first.
Importantly, participants were unconstrained in how they chose to describe the
pictures. The manipulation of interest, for our purposes, was whether
participants were primed (immediately before seeing the picture) with an auditory
presentation of a word that was semantically related to either the agent (e.g.,
honey) or the patient (e.g., adult) depicted in the event.
As can be seen in Figure 3, significantly more sentences were generated
with the primed target (i.e., agent or patient) mentioned first. Interestingly,
phonological primes related to the agent (e.g., fee) or patient (e.g., can) had no
effect on the syntactical structure of participant generated sentences.
Participants were required to process each picture in a meaningful way in order
to produce accurate descriptions of the depicted events. Hence, only the
accessibility of information related to the meanings of words (which was
applicable to the nature of their task) affected the syntax of the generated
sentences (see also Garrett, 1975, 1980). Taken another way, these results
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Figure 3. Proportion of participant generated sentences in which primed target
words (i.e., agent or patient) were mentioned first or second (data adapted from
Bock, 1986).
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represent further evidence that temporarily accessible (and applicable)
information may influence the product of an open-ended response, in this case
the syntactical structure of a sentence.
Relevance to Episodic Future Thought
One may reasonably infer, based on the above review of three ostensibly
unrelated lines of research, that accessible (and applicable) knowledge has a
strong influence on open-ended production tasks. As such, confidence is gained
in the hypothesis that a similar pattern of results might emerge in the context of
episodic future thought. To the extent that episodic future thought is open-ended
(i.e., based on initial constraints; e.g., task instructions), relevant information that
is in a relatively accessible state should determine the content of a participantgenerated episode. Such an outcome would provide insight into this little
understood, but ubiquitous, mental phenomenon. This hypothesis was the focus
of Experiments 1 and 2 of this dissertation.
Further, because parallels have been drawn between episodic future
thought and other open-ended production tasks, it will be important to
demonstrate that certain variables known to influence open-ended production in
general have a similar influence on episodic future thought. As was discussed
above, the extent to which primed knowledge biases performance on conceptual
implicit tasks, impression formation tasks, and sentence production tasks
depends on how meaningfully that information is initially processed. Experiment
3 will examine whether a similar pattern of results emerges in the context of
episodic future thought.
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Introduction to the Experiments
Three experiments were conducted to begin to answer the question of
interest: What is the role of knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought? In
order to gain some leverage on this issue, a priming paradigm was implemented
that bears a family resemblance to those discussed earlier in relation to implicit
memory, impression formation, and sentence production. That is, the paradigm
was designed to examine whether participant-generated episodes of the future
would be influenced by relevant information that they had been exposed to on an
earlier, ostensibly unrelated, exposure task.
Specifically, in each of the experiments that will be discussed below,
participants were instructed to complete a series of three mental manipulation
tasks: 1) constructing sentences from scrambled arrangements of words, 2)
solving math problems, and 3) generating a personal future episode. The cover
story was that the experimenter was interested in whether participants who are
good at mentally manipulating one type of information (i.e., verbal or non-verbal)
are also good at mentally manipulating other types of information. In reality, the
sentence construction task (which was always completed first in the context of a
between-subjects design) did or did not prime participants with knowledge
relevant to the third, and final, episode generation task. The question of interest,
in all three experiments, was whether (and under what circumstances)
knowledge that was made accessible through priming would shape the content of
participant-generated episodes. The mental math task simply served as a brief
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delay between the exposure phase and episode generation phase, and to
enhance the credibility of the cover story.
Experiment 1: Knowledge Accessibility in Episodic Future Thought
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether, given a
predetermined set of constraints, the content of episodic future thought would be
influenced by applicable knowledge that was in a relatively accessible state.
Specifically, participants in this experiment were asked to generate a personally
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the
next week. The constraints of this episode generation task were that the event
must occur in a specific setting (on or near school campus) and within a specific
time frame (next week). As such, the instructions delimited the information that
could potentially become incorporated into the episode. Nonetheless, there
remain a large number of scenarios that participants could potentially imagine in
relation to this cue. The question of interest was whether participants would be
more likely to generate social (e.g., going to a party) or academic (e.g., going to
class) scenarios after they had been primed to think about information relevant to
similar situations (i.e., social or academic) in the context of an earlier task.
Before this experiment is outlined in more detail, one issue deserves
mention. Although students are likely to think about events that occur on or near
their school campus in their daily lives, it is unlikely that they are ever asked to
think about the first such event that comes to mind. Rather, episodic future
thought typically reflects events that one is currently excited or anxious about
(which, for a student, may often times involve a campus related setting).
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However, in order to make the study of knowledge accessibility in episodic future
thought tractable, it is necessary to introduce experimentally defined constraints
on episodic future thought. That way, the experimenter can have an idea of what
types of situations are applicable to a given cue and examine whether making
knowledge related to a specific situation more accessible will shape the content
of participant-generated episodes.
Design
There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition:
social group, academic group, control group), in this experiment. Notably, a
between-subjects design was instantiated (in all 3 experiments) based on welldocumented evidence from the social psychological literature that significant
effects of priming are difficult to obtain when multiple concepts are primed in a
single experimental session (e.g., DeCoster & Claypool, 2004).
Method
Participants
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment. Twothirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University.
Materials
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, episode generation). During
the sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful
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sentences in response to scrambled arrangements of words (c.f. Costin, 1969;
Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980). A total of 30 scrambled word cues were used in this
experiment (see Appendix B for a complete list of stimuli). Six of these
scrambled word cues specified social situations, 6 were related to academic
situations, and 18 were control cues that did not converge on a specific situation.
During the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to solve 6
multiplication problems [e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?]. Finally, in the episode generation
phase (phase 3), participants were asked to construct a personally relevant
future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week
(see Appendix C for complete set of instructions).
Procedure
Participants were initially informed that this experiment was designed to
test their ability to mentally manipulate verbal (sentence construction) and nonverbal (math and episode generation) stimuli. Further, it was explained to them
that the experimenter was interested in whether people who are good at mentally
manipulating one type of stimuli are also good at mentally manipulating other
types of stimuli. Accordingly, participants were asked to complete each one of
the three tasks as quickly and as accurately as possible. Finally, participants
were told that the three tasks would be presented in random order. In fact, the
order of task presentation was consistent across participants (i.e., sentence
construction, math, episode generation).
In the first phase of the experiment, each participant was presented with
18 (of 30) scrambled word cues. The scrambled word cues appeared one at a
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time in the center of a computer screen and each contained 5 words that were
arranged in a nonsensical order (e.g., fun the was party boring). Participants
were required to use 4 of the words in each cue to generate a sentence that was
most relevant to them (e.g., the party was fun) and to type in their responses as
quickly as possible. Responses were typed in a space provided directly below
each cue.
Participants in the social group were presented with 6 scrambled word
cues that could be used to generate sentences related to social situations and 12
cues that did not converge on a specific situation. The order of presentation of
the scrambled word cues was such that the 6 social cues appeared in positions
three, six, nine, twelve, fifteen, and eighteen. The remaining 12 positions drew a
random selection of 12 of the 18 control cues. Participants in the academic
group completed the experimental task in the same fashion, with the following
exception. These participants were presented with 6 scrambled word cues that
could be used to generate sentences related to academic situations, rather than
social situations (but also appearing in positions three, six, nine, twelve, fifteen,
and eighteen). Finally, participants in the control group were presented with (in
random order) all 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific
situation.
In the second phase, all participants were presented with 6 math
problems. These math problems appeared one at a time in the center of a
computer screen. Participants were required to answer these problems as
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quickly as possible. Responses were typed in a space provided directly below
each question.
In the third phase, all participants were asked to construct a personally
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the
next week. Participants were instructed that they had two minutes to describe
the event in as much detail as possible. Responses were typed in a space
provided directly below the cue.
Finally, upon completing the experiment, all participants were asked two
questions that served as a manipulation check. First, participants were asked to
guess the true purpose of the experiment. Second, participants were asked to
indicate when they initially became aware of this purpose. The data of any
participant who claimed that information from the sentence construction phase
influenced the nature of their episodic future thought, and who was aware of this
influence during the course of the experiment, was excluded from analysis. The
entire experiment took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
Results and Discussion
Scoring Criteria
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting a
social, academic, or unrelated scenario by two independent raters who were
blind to experimental conditions. Raters were instructed to score a scenario as
‘social’ if the depicted event focused on the participant’s social interactions with
others (e.g., attending a party, eating lunch with a group of friends at school), as
‘academic’ if the event focused on the participant’s academic obligations (e.g.,
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attending class, studying for a test), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not
constitute a social or academic activity (e.g., walking around campus, waking up
in the morning).
The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .91 (Cohen, 1960). Any
disagreements between raters were discussed and assigned to a single
category. This was only the case for 5 events. Exclusion of these events did not
change the general pattern of results and so these events were included in all
subsequent analyses.
Manipulation Check
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at
the time they generated their episodic future thought. In fact, once prompted to
guess the true purpose of the experiment, only one participant was able to do so.
This participant was in the academic group. Interestingly, they did not generate
an episode that was congruent with the primes they had been exposed to earlier
(i.e., academically relevant sentences). Since this individual claimed that they
were not aware of the purpose until they had been instructed to think about it,
their data was included in all subsequent analyses (cf. Schacter, Bowers, &
Booker, 1989).
Distribution of Events
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the social,
academic, and, control groups is presented in Figure 4. In order to examine
whether recent exposure to relevant information (i.e., situations depicted in
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Figure 4. Results for Experiment 1. Proportion of event types generated as a
function of priming condition. Relative to the control group, participants in the
social group generated more socially relevant future thoughts. Similarly,
participants in the academic group generated more academically relevant future
thoughts than those in the control group.
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sentences) shaped the content of participant generated episodes, the distribution
of events generated by participants in the social and academic groups were
separately contrasted against the distribution of events generated by participants
in the control group.
First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the social group (i.e., 21 ‘social’ scenarios, 6
‘academic’ scenarios, and 3 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly from the
distribution of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 14
‘social’ scenarios, 8 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 8 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N=
30) = 7.13, p = .028. This analysis was followed with three a-priori contrasts that
separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘social’, ‘academic’, and
‘unrelated’ events generated by the social and control groups. Two comparisons
reached significance. Critically, participants in the social group were more likely
to generate a socially relevant scenario than those in the control group (Z = 1.87,
p = .031). Further, participants in the control group were more likely to generate
an unrelated scenario than those in the social group (Z = 1.77, p = .038).
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the academic group (i.e., 13 ‘social’
scenarios, 15 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 2 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) also differed
significantly from the distribution of events generated by the control group (i.e.,
14 ‘social’ scenarios, 8 ‘academic’ scenarios, and 8 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2,
N= 30) = 10.69, p =.005. This analysis was also followed with three a-priori
contrasts that separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘social’,
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‘academic’, and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the academic and control
groups. Two comparisons reached significance. Critically, participants in the
academic group were more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario
than those in the control group (Z = 2.47, p = .007). Further, participants in the
control group were more likely to generate an unrelated scenario than those in
the academic group (Z = 2.12, p = .017).
Discussion
These results present clear evidence that knowledge accessibility
influences the content of episodic future thought. Participants in the social and
academic groups were more likely than would be expected by chance to
generate future episodes that were congruent with the relevant information that
they had recently been exposed to in the context of a sentence construction task
(i.e., social and academic situations, respectively).
Experiment 2: Knowledge Accessibility with Higher Levels of Constraint
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to extend the generality of the findings
from Experiment 1 (that knowledge accessibility influences the content of
episodic future thought). In Experiment 1, episodic future thought was
constrained to a specific setting (on or near school campus) and time frame (next
week). In Experiment 2, an additional constraint was introduced into the
instructions specifying the nature of the episode generation task. Specifically,
participants in this experiment were asked to construct a personally relevant
future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week
and that was related to an academic situation. That is, the episode was
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constrained to a specific setting (on or near school campus), a specific time
frame (next week), and a specific activity (academic). While this additional
constraint should further delimit the amount of knowledge that is applicable to the
episode, there still exist a large number of alternative scenarios that one could
potentially generate in response to this cue. The question of interest was
whether participants would be more likely to generate an academically related
scenario occurring in the context of a classroom (e.g., attending a lecture) or
outside the classroom (e.g., studying in the library) after they had been primed to
think about information relevant to similar situations (i.e., academic situations
occurring inside or outside the classroom) in the context of an earlier task.
Design
There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition:
classroom group, study group, control group), in this experiment.
Method
Participants
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment. Twothirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University.
Materials
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, simulation). During the
sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful
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sentences in response to scrambled arrangements of words. A total of 30
scrambled word cues were used in this experiment (see Appendix B for a
complete list of stimuli). Six of these scrambled word cues specified classroom
situations, 6 were related to studying outside the classroom, and 18 were control
cues that did not converge on a specific situation (same control cues as
Experiment 1). During the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to
solve 6 math problems [e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?] (same problems as Experiment 1).
Finally, in the episode generation phase (phase 3), participants were asked to
construct a personally relevant future event that might occur on or near their
school campus within the next week and that was related to an academic
situation (see Appendix C for complete set of instructions).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, with
the following exceptions. Participants in the classroom group were presented
with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to generate sentences related to
academic situations occurring in the classroom and participants in the study
group were presented with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to
generate sentences related to academic situations occurring outside the
classroom (participants in both groups were also presented with 12 scrambled
word cues that did not converge on a specific situation). As was the case in
Experiment 1, participants in the control group were presented with (in random
order) all 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific situation.
After the intervening delay phase (i.e., math problems), participants in all three
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groups were asked to construct a personally relevant future event that might
occur on or near their school campus within the next week and that was related
to an academic situation. The entire experiment, including the manipulation
check, took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
Results and Discussion
Scoring Criteria
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting
an academic activity occurring inside the classroom, an academic activity
occurring outside the classroom, or an unrelated scenario by two independent
raters who were blind to experimental conditions. Raters were instructed to
score a scenario as ‘classroom’ if the depicted event took place in the context of
an academic class (e.g., listening to a lecture, taking a test), as ‘study’ if the
event involved preparation for an upcoming academic obligation (e.g., studying in
the library or at home), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not constitute an
academic activity occurring inside or outside the classroom (e.g., walking
between classes, purchasing materials for class).
The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .95. Any disagreements
between raters were discussed and assigned to a single category. This was only
the case for 3 events. Exclusion of these events did not change the general
pattern of results and so these events were included in all subsequent analyses.
Manipulation Check
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at
the time they generated their episodic future thought. In fact, once prompted to
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guess the true purpose of the experiment, only one participant was able to do so.
This participant was in the classroom group. As was the case in Experiment 1,
this participant did not generate an episode that was congruent with the primes
they had been exposed to earlier (i.e., sentences related to academic situations
occurring in the classroom). Since this individual claimed that they were not
aware of the purpose until they had been instructed to think about it, their data
were included in all subsequent analyses.
Distribution of Events
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the
classroom, study, and control groups is presented in Figure 5. In order to
examine whether recent exposure to relevant information (i.e., situations
depicted in sentences) shaped the content of participant generated episodes, the
distribution of events generated by participants in the classroom and study
groups were separately contrasted against the distribution of events generated
by participants in the control group.
First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the classroom group (i.e., 10 ‘classroom’
scenarios, 9 ‘study’ scenarios, and 11 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly
from the distribution of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e.,
5 ‘classroom’ scenarios, 11 ‘study’ scenarios, and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2
(2, N= 30) = 6.01, p = .049. This analysis was followed with three a-priori
contrasts that separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘classroom’,
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Figure 5. Results for Experiment 2. Proportion of event types generated as a
function of priming condition. Relative to the control group, participants in the
classroom group generated more academically relevant future thoughts occurring
in the classroom. Similarly, participants in the study group generated more
academically relevant future thoughts occurring outside the classroom than those
in the control group.
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‘study’, and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the classroom and control groups.
Critically, one comparison reached significance, such that participants in the
classroom group were more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario
occurring in the classroom than those in the control group (Z = 2.23, p = .013).
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the study group (i.e., 3 ‘classroom’ scenarios,
18 ‘study’ scenarios, and 9 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) also differed significantly from
the distribution of events generated by the control group (i.e., 5 ‘classroom’
scenarios, 11 ‘study’ scenarios, and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N= 30) =
7.04, p = .029. This analysis was also followed with three a-priori contrasts that
separately examined the difference in proportions of ‘classroom’, ‘study’, and
‘unrelated’ events generated by the study and control groups. Critically, one
comparison reached significance, such that participants in the study group were
more likely to generate an academically relevant scenario occurring outside the
classroom than those in the control group (Z = 2.11, p = .017).
Discussion
The results of this experiment are important in two respects. First,
Experiment 2 serves as a conceptual replication of the findings obtained in
Experiment 1. Second, these results provide further evidence for the role of
knowledge accessibility in episodic future thought. Participants in the classroom
and study groups were more likely than would be expected by chance to
generate future episodes that were congruent with the relevant information that
they had recently been exposed to in the context of a sentence construction task
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(i.e., academic situations occurring within and outside the classroom,
respectively).
Experiment 3: Relating Episodic Future Thought to Other Open-ended
Production Tasks
As was discussed earlier, the extent to which primed knowledge biases
performance on open-ended production tasks (see Section 3) depends on how
meaningfully that information is initially processed. In order to examine whether
a similar relationship exists in the context of episodic future thought, participants
in Experiment 3 were asked to process scrambled word cues in either a
conceptual manner (i.e., similar to Experiments 1 and 2) or in a structural
manner. If conceptually based processes moderate the relationship between
primed knowledge and episodic future thought, then participants who process the
scrambled word cues in a meaningful way should show more priming on a later
episode generation task (for which the content of those cues is relevant; cf.
Experiments 1 and 2) than participants who process those same cues in a nonmeaningful manner (i.e., counting vowels).
Design
There was one between-subjects variable, with 3 levels (priming condition:
conceptual group, structural group, control group), in this experiment.
Method
Participants
Thirty undergraduates were recruited for each level of the between
subjects variable, yielding a total of 90 participants for this experiment. Two-
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thirds of the participants in each condition were tested at Washington University
in St. Louis and one-third were tested at Iowa State University.
Materials
A separate set of materials was administered in each of the three phases
of the experiment (i.e., sentence construction, math, simulation). During the
sentence construction phase (phase 1), participants generated meaningful
sentences (or counted vowels) in response to scrambled arrangements of words.
A total of 24 scrambled word cues were used in this experiment (see Appendix B
for a complete list of stimuli). Six of these scrambled word cues specified
academic situations (same as Experiment 1) and 18 were control cues that did
not converge on a specific situation (same control cues as Experiment 1). During
the delay period (phase 2), participants were asked to solve 6 math problems
[e.g., (6 x 13)/2 = ?] (same problems as Experiment 1). Finally, in the episode
generation phase (phase 3), participants were asked to construct a personally
relevant future event that might occur on or near their school campus within the
next week (same as Experiment 1; see Appendix C).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1, with
the following exceptions. Participants in the conceptual and structural groups
were both presented with 6 scrambled word cues that could be used to generate
sentences related to academic situations and 12 cues that did not converge on a
specific situation. As was the case in Experiment 1, participants in the
conceptual group were asked to use these cues to construct meaningful
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sentences. Participants in the structural group, however, were asked to count
the number of vowels that were present in each cue (i.e., scrambled arrangement
of words) as quickly and as accurately as possible. Responses for both groups
were typed in a space provided directly below each cue. Finally, participants in
the control group were asked to generate meaningful sentences in response to
the 18 scrambled word cues that did not converge on a specific situation.
Results and Discussion
Scoring Criteria
All 90 participant-generated episodes were classified as either depicting
an academic or unrelated scenario by two independent raters who were blind to
experimental conditions. Raters were instructed to score a scenario as
‘academic’ if the event focused on the participant’s academic obligations (e.g.,
attending class, studying for a test), and as ‘unrelated’ if the event did not
constitute an academic activity (e.g., walking around campus, going to a party).
The resulting inter-rater reliability was high, Κ = .90. Any disagreements
between raters were discussed and assigned to a single category. This was only
the case for 4 events. Exclusion of these events did not change the general
pattern of results and so these events were included in all subsequent analyses.
Manipulation Check
All 90 participants were unaware of the true purpose of the experiment at
the time they generated their episodic future thought. In fact, once prompted to
guess the true purpose of the experiment, no participant was able to do so.
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Distribution of Events
The distribution of future episodes generated by participants in the
conceptual, structural, and control groups is presented in Figure 6. In order to
examine whether the manner in which primed knowledge was processed
moderated the influence of that information on the content of participant
generated episodes, the distribution of events generated by participants in the
conceptual and structural groups were separately contrasted against the
distribution of events generated by participants in the control group.
First, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the conceptual group (i.e., 16 ‘academic’
scenarios and 14 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) differed significantly from the distribution
of events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 6 ‘academic’
scenarios and 24 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 (2, N= 30) = 20.83, p < .001. This
analysis was followed with two a-priori contrasts that separately examined the
difference in proportions of ‘academic’ and ‘unrelated’ events generated by the
conceptual and control groups. Both comparisons reached significance.
Critically, participants in the conceptual group were more likely to generate an
academically relevant scenario than those in the control group (Z = 4.08, p <
.001). Further, participants in the control group were more likely to generate an
unrelated scenario than those in the conceptual group (Z = 2.04, p = .021).
A second chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the distribution of
events generated by participants in the structural group (i.e., 8 ‘academic’
scenarios and 22 ‘unrelated’ scenarios) did not differ from the distribution of
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Figure 6. Results for Experiment 3. Proportion of event types generated as a
function of priming condition. Relative to the control group, participants in the
conceptual group generated more academically relevant future thoughts.
Conversely, participants in the structural group did not differ from those in the
control group.
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events generated by participants in the control group (i.e., 6 ‘academic’ scenarios
and 24 ‘unrelated’ scenarios), χ2 < 1. Importantly, participants in the structural
group were found to spend a statistically similar amount of time completing their
sentence task (i.e., counting vowels) as those in the conceptual group (who
constructed meaningful sentences) (Ms = 6752 ms and 6552 ms, respectively; t
< 1). Hence, the lack of priming for the structural group, relative to the
conceptual group, may be attributed to the absence of meaning-based
processing of the sentence stimuli.
Discussion
The results of this experiment show clearly that conceptual processing
moderates the relationship between priming and episodic future thought.
Specifically, participants in the conceptual group were more likely to generate
future episodes related to academic activities than those in the control group.
Moreover, the structural and control groups did not differ from one another (cf.
Srinivas & Roediger, 1990).
General Discussion
When one is cued to think about a personal future episode (either in daily
life or in the laboratory) a specific scenario often comes to mind. This prominent
feature of episodic future thought is so familiar to those who possess the capacity
that it may seem trivial. However, there exists a large amount of personal
knowledge that is relevant to any given cue to think about the future. As such,
there must exist some underlying cognitive mechanisms that determine which
knowledge becomes incorporated. Here, the results of three experiments
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suggest that knowledge accessibility may represent one such mechanism. Next,
we will relate these findings to the relevant literature and discuss their broader
implications.
Knowledge Accessibility and its Relation to Future Thought
The idea that knowledge accessibility might have an influence over the
nature of one’s thoughts about the future is reminiscent of the role of heuristics
and biases in human decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In
particular, Tversky and Kahneman showed that participants’ estimates of the
likelihood with which various events would occur in the future were influenced by
the ease with which similar examples were retrieved from memory. For example,
when asked to estimate the probability that one’s car will be stolen in the future,
people who have had experiences with car theft (either personally or vicariously)
will estimate a higher probability of future car theft than those with little prior
experience. The authors referred to this process as the availability heuristic.
Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman suggested that a similar heuristic might be at
work when people think about rare events for which there may be no relevant
memories to draw upon. Specifically, the authors suggested that in thinking
about unique events people generate hypothetical scenarios, and the ease with
which such scenarios come to mind influences the estimated likelihood of their
occurrence. This particular process was later referred to as the simulation
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Importantly, both heuristics denote a
close relationship between knowledge accessibility and future thinking. That is,
in both cases, accessible knowledge becomes cognitively available and people

42

are likely to base their judgments of future probability on that information (and
how effortlessly it comes to mind; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003).
It is proposed that a similar principle underlies the mental construction of
episodic future thought. Specifically, the contents of episodic future thought
seem, at least in part, to be shaped by readily accessible knowledge that is
relevant to a personal future episode that one has in mind. In the current
experiments, participants were more likely than would be expected by chance to
generate future episodes that were congruent with relevant information that they
had experienced in the context of an earlier task. In Experiment 1, for instance,
participants were asked to think about a personal future episode that might occur
on or near their school campus within the next week. Given this specific set of
constraints, the knowledge that participants could use to generate a scenario
(e.g., information related to settings, people, and objects) was effectively
delimited. It was then possible to examine whether priming information relevant
to one type of event (e.g., an academic situation) relative to another (e.g., a
social situation) would shape the content of participant-generated episodes.
Relative to a control group, participants who had been primed to think about
information relevant to academic or social situations were more likely to generate
academic or social scenarios, respectively. This general pattern of results was
replicated and extended upon in Experiment 2. Specifically, in Experiment 2 the
relevant knowledge base was further delimited by employing one additional
constraint. That is, participants were asked to think about a personal future
episode that might occur on or near their school campus within the next week
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and that was related to an academic situation. Relative to a control group,
participants who had been primed to think about information relevant to
academic situations occurring inside or outside the classroom were more likely to
generate academic scenarios occurring inside or outside the classroom,
respectively.
In both experiments, participants were asked to use scrambled
arrangements of words (e.g., fun the was party boring) to construct sentences
that were most relevant to them (e.g., ‘the party was fun’ versus ‘the party was
boring’). How is it that this priming task was so effective in shaping the theme of
a personal future episode? At this juncture, it might be premature to make any
claims that go beyond the argument that engaging in the meaningful processing
(cf. Experiment 3) of information relevant to an upcoming open-ended production
task (episodic future thought, in this case) will shape the content of that task. For
instance, it will be interesting for future research to examine whether similar
effects might be obtained with various other priming materials (e.g., pictorial
stimuli). Notwithstanding, some insights were gained from an informal postexperiment interview.1 Specifically, participants tended to report that they used
whatever personal experiences came to mind to help them decide how to
complete each sentence (e.g., deciding whether a fun or boring party was more
pertinent to them). Hence, participants who were primed to think about
information relevant to a particular type of situation (e.g., social) brought to mind
relevant personal information that subsequently enhanced the likelihood of
imagining a related experience occurring in the future. In other words, perhaps
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the nature of the priming materials used is not as important as the information
that participants associate with those materials. Prior research has shown that
similar events take place in one’s recent past and future (D'Argembeau & Van
der Linden, 2004; Spreng & Levine, 2006; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008). Hence,
recent experiences may provide a particularly useful source of information when
thinking about upcoming events. Of course, future research will need to more
systematically evaluate these claims.
On the basis of the present results, it is reasonable to assume (given a
particular cue to think about the future) that knowledge accessibility fluctuates
over time and that the exact content of episodic future thought will depend, in
part, on the timing of the thought. It will be interesting for future research to
further examine the specificity of this effect. For instance, all things being equal,
is one more likely to imagine the same event in a particular setting, or incorporate
a particular individual or object, based on their recent experiences? The present
results suggest that this should be the case. Importantly, no assumptions are
made regarding the nature of the underlying knowledge that is evoked in the
construction of episodic future thought. That is, this knowledge may be
semantic, episodic, or any other form (cf. Forster & Liberman, 2007; Higgins,
1996), as long as it is relatively accessible (Szpunar, in press).
Thus far, discussion has focused on knowledge that is made temporarily
accessible through recent thought about relevant information. That is not to say,
however, that other sources of accessibility do not exist. For instance, research
on impression formation has shown that some knowledge structures may be
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chronically accessible as a result of either stable personality characteristics
(Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Higgins & Brendl,
1995; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) or frequent priming (of those knowledge
structures) in the laboratory (Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Lombardi,
Higgins, & Bargh, 1987). In general, chronically accessible knowledge structures
appear to exert more long-term influences on impression formation than
temporarily accessible knowledge structures (for a review see Higgins, 1996). It
is certainly feasible that similar principles apply to episodic future thought. For
instance, some aspects of knowledge may be chronically accessible in relation to
a specific future event if they have been frequently associated with thoughts
about similar future events in the past. Perhaps one good place to begin this
particular line of inquiry would be to examine the relation between frequency of
priming and the retention interval separating priming from episodic future
thought.
As is the case with any new area of research, the answer to one question
opens the door for many others. For instance, questions related to potential
issues regarding priming materials, frequency of priming, and the delay between
priming and episodic future thought have already been considered. Each of
these questions revolve around the theme of knowledge accessibility in episodic
future thought and point to avenues through which the present findings may be
extended in the future. Next, we will shift focus and consider what occurs during
the episodic future thought task itself. Until now, there has been an almost
implicit assumption in the literature that episodic future thought evokes mental
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simulation (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 2008;
Szpunar, in press). However, there exist no direct data to corroborate this claim.
A better understanding of the level of representation that underlies episodic
future thought will be necessary for understanding the relation between episodic
future thought and knowledge accessibility. Some directions for future research
are considered below.
Future Directions: Mental Simulation and Episodic Future Thought
Evidence in support of the assumption that episodic future thought evokes
mental simulation may be derived from two sources: 1) neuroimaging data
showing that episodic future thought engages neural regions responsible for
visual-spatial processing (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, in press; Addis et
al., 2007; Botzung et al., 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., in press;
Szpunar et al., 2007) and simulation of bodily movements (Szpunar et al., 2007),
and 2) subjective reports (e.g., D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006).
However, arguments against these particular sources of evidence may be easily
raised. First, no neuroimaging study of episodic future thought has been
conducted to directly test this assumption. Thus, while the extant neuroimaging
literature may suggest that episodic future thought engages regions associated
with mental simulation, specific studies will need to be conducted in order to
provide more substantive data. One potential approach might be to query a priori
regions of interest that have been identified in the mental simulation literature
(e.g., Decety & Grezes, 2006; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Hesslow, 2002) and
examine what patterns of activity are associated with episodic future thought in
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those regions. Second, although subjective reports are informative, they will
need to be backed up by behavioral data. To date, no such behavioral studies
have been conducted. Although we await such work, some preliminary
considerations can be made with the situation model literature in mind.
Thinking About Events: Situation Models
Much of what one reads, hears, and thinks about in their daily life has to
do with situations. For instance, whether one is reading an interesting story in a
newspaper article or listening to a friend retell a story about a recent weekend,
one learns about a series of interconnected events that constitute a specific
situation. What mechanism underlies the ability to comprehend situations
inherent in discourse? Is the same mechanism involved regardless of the
modality through which information about situations is learned? Next, we will
consider evidence that discourse comprehension is aided by the construction of
high-level (referential) mental representations, namely situation models.
The ability to understand a described set of circumstances has been
considered extensively in studies that examine memory for language and text.
Specifically, researchers in this field have advanced the idea that memory for
language and text involves three levels of representation: 1) the surface form
(i.e., memory for specific words and syntax), 2) the propositional textbase (i.e.,
memory for ideas conveyed that are independent of wording), and 3) the
situation model (i.e., memory for the described situation). For present purposes,
we will focus on mental representations at the level of the situation model (see
Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
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In their seminal study, Bradsford, Barclay, and Franks (1972) presented
participants with sentence stimuli such as “Three turtles rested on a log and a
fish swam beneath them.” In a later recognition phase, participants were likely to
misidentify the sentence “Three turtles rested on a log and a fish swam beneath
it” as having been studied in the exposure phase. The authors claimed that the
effect occurred because both sentences describe the same situation. In contrast,
participants were less likely to make the error when presented with the sentence
“Three turtles rested beside a log and a fish swam beneath them” in the
exposure phase and the sentence “Three turtles rested beside a log and a fish
swam beneath it” in the recognition phase. Although this latter pair of sentences
also differed by only one word (i.e., them or it), the situations described by these
sentences were decidedly different. This pattern of results suggested that
participant’s memories for text were guided by the described situation and not by
the language itself (see also Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987).
Since then, a considerable amount of research has shown that people
form multidimensional situation models that aid in the comprehension of
discourse. Among the various components of situation models that have
received empirical attention are spatial-temporal frameworks (i.e., the location in
space and time, or context, in which an event tasks place), tokens and their
interrelations (i.e., the relevant people and objects that are embedded within a
specific spatial-temporal framework, their relevant properties, spatial
arrangement, and so on), and linking relations among a series of spatial-temporal
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frameworks (e.g., temporal, casual) (for a detailed review see Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998; for a more recent discussion see Radvansky, 2008).
According to Radvansky (2008), situation models are “mental simulations”
(p. 230) of a described set of circumstances (see also Zwaan, 1999). Of course,
that claim does not necessarily mean that people construct life-like (or imagebased) mental representations in their minds when processing discourse (cf.
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Rather, most researchers in this field subscribe to the
view that discourse comprehension is aided by the construction of high-level,
abstract, mental representations of situations (cf. Barsalou, 1999). This view is
supported by findings that comprehension performance is highly similar across
modality. For instance, Baggett (1979) found that participants who viewed a
short film depicting a series of events produced structurally similar recall
protocols as participants who heard a spoken version of the story. In another
study, Gernsbacher, Varner, and Faust (1990) found that comprehension of
various forms of discourse (e.g., reading, listening, viewing) was highly correlated
within participants. That is, participants who were good at comprehending
written materials were also good at comprehending auditory materials, and so
on. This latter finding makes little sense if one assumes that participants in this
experiment only created a mental representation of the discourse itself.
However, it makes sense if one assumes that participants constructed higherlevel representations of the situations described in the discourse (irrespective of
modality).
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Relevance to Episodic Future Thought
On the basis of the evidence that people generate high-level, abstract,
representations about the situations that they read and hear about, it does not
seem too much of a stretch to suggest that people may rely upon a similar
mechanism when thinking about the situations they generate in the course of
episodic future thought. By definition, episodic future thought involves thinking
about specific events, or situations, that one might potentially encounter in their
personal life (Szpunar, in press). While there exists no experimental evidence to
corroborate this claim, simply examining participant generated protocols of future
scenarios provides some clues. For instance, consider again the scenario
generated by the sample participant in Table 1. The sample participant
generated a scenario that took place in a specific spatial-temporal framework
(i.e., a familiar beach), involved various tokens and their interrelations (e.g., the
participant’s friends, beach ware; spatial relations between people and objects),
and contained various linking relations that served to connect a series of events
into a coherent representation of one specific scenario (i.e., the participant
described a series of events that will occur, one after the other, in the course of
spending a day on the beach). It will be interesting for future research to
examine whether these features of episodic future thought are mentally
represented in a way that complements relevant work in the situation model
literature. With regard to knowledge accessibility, if it turns out that certain
materials are better able to prime episodic future thought, then it will be
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informative to have a clear understanding of how participants are representing
those thoughts.
Concluding Remarks
The present findings are meant to represent an initial step towards a more
complete understanding of the capacity for the human mind/brain to flexibly
(re)organize knowledge in the construction of personal future episodes. Although
it is clear that there is much to learn about episodic future thought, two important
points deserve mention. First, episodic future thought represents a cognitive
capacity that is amenable to inquiry in the behavioral laboratory. Much of our
current understanding of episodic future thought has been gained through
studies conducted with patient populations and neuroimaging techniques.
Although these approaches will doubtless continue to provide insights into this
fascinating capacity, examining episodic future thought from a behavioral
standpoint will also be informative and useful. Second, episodic future thought
shares features in common with other cognitive tasks. Drawing upon those
relations helped to provide insight and justification for conducting the current set
of experiments. Moreover, the outcome of these experiments revealed that
principles that have previously been identified with tasks that might arguably lack
ecological validity (e.g., name the first eight animals that come to mind) hold in
the context of a mental activity that people engage in on a daily basis
(D'Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2009). Such comparisons
emphasize the importance of examining the relations between tasks that often
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times receive little crosstalk but that may, when examined together, highlight
underlying principles of cognitive functioning.
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Footnote
1

The final 55 participants who were run in the present set of three
experiments were asked to identify any strategies that they might have engaged
in to help them to construct sentences from the scrambled arrangements of
words.
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Appendix A
Partial transcript of informal interview
--A personal future episode from a sample participant (Table 1)--

Question about general event
Experimenter (E): Why do you think you thought about this specific event?
Participant (P): I’ve been thinking a lot lately about taking a vacation with some of my friends this
summer. It will be the last chance we’ll have for fun before graduate school.

Questions about setting
E: Why do you think this event occurred where it did?
P: Well, I’d like to take a trip somewhere that has a nice beach. Nice was the first place that
came to mind.
E: How familiar are you with this specific location?
P: Well, I’ve been to Nice before so…pretty familiar.
E: How many times have you been to the particular beach you imagined?
P: Just once. Last time I was there, we spent a short time at the beach and I remember wanting
to go back one day.
E: Why do you think you specifically imagined being on the beach and not doing something else,
like site seeing?
P: I guess it’s because I want to take a vacation to a place where I can just sit back in the sun.
But, of course, I’ll want to do other things while I’m there. That city is something else.
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Appendix B
Scrambled word cues (and sample completions)
Social situations (6) – Experiment 1
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

movies group the watched television (e.g., the group watched movies)
fun the was party boring (e.g., the party was fun)
played friends cards sports the (e.g., the friends played sports)
lunch the dinner roommates ate (e.g., the roommates ate dinner)
was workout their short long (e.g., their workout was long)
pleasant date was awkward the (e.g., the date was pleasant)

Academic situations (6) – Experiments 1 and 3
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

teacher the quickly spoke slowly (e.g., the teacher spoke slowly)
interesting lecture the was boring (e.g., the lecture was interesting)
class late the early ended (e.g., the class ended early)
night all studied procrastinated he (e.g., he studied all night)
was homework the easy hard (e.g., the homework was easy)
library the peaceful was noisy (e.g., the library was noisy)

Classroom situations (6) – Experiment 2
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

teacher the quickly spoke slowly (e.g., the teacher spoke quickly)*
interesting lecture the was boring (e.g., the lecture was interesting)*
class late the early ended (e.g., the class ended early)*
took notes she skimpy detailed (e.g., she took detailed notes)
ignored the teacher questions answered (e.g., the teacher answered questions)
student was lecturer the presenting (e.g., the student was presenting)

* same as Experiments 1 and 3

Non-classroom situations (6) – Experiment 2
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

night all studied procrastinated he (e.g., he studied all night)*
was homework the easy hard (e.g., the homework was easy)*
library the peaceful was noisy (e.g., the library was noisy)*
her long short was essay (e.g., her essay was short)
memorized notes she her rehearsed (e.g., she memorized her notes)
uninteresting the was uninteresting book (e.g., the book was interesting)

* same as Experiments 1 and 3
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Control cues (18) – Experiments 1, 2, and 3
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)

is boy the tall short (e.g., the boy is tall)
sad girl the happy is (e.g., the girl is happy)
rabbit cute is ugly the (e.g., the rabbit is cute)
the rude is kind man (e.g., the man is rude)
is cut the grass green (e.g., the grass is green)
small plane the large is (e.g., the plane is large)
weak chair the is sturdy (e.g., the chair is sturdy)
hard ball is the soft (e.g., the ball is soft)
stopped the suddenly skidded car (e.g., the car stopped suddenly)
fast slow tractor is the (e.g., the tractor is slow)
young woman felt the old (e.g., the woman felt young)
object is the heavy light (e.g., the object is light)
the is old new clock (e.g., the clock is new)
is snake the long short (e.g., the snake is long)
flew kite high far the (e.g., the kite flew high)
orange is yellow boat the (e.g., the boat is yellow)
is window the clean dirty (e.g., the window is clean)
full box is the empty (e.g., the box is full)
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Appendix C
Episode Generation Instructions
Experiments 1 and 3
In the space below, please describe an event involving you somewhere on or near campus within
the next week. This can be about anything, so long as it involves you somewhere on, or close to,
campus. Just describe the first event that comes to mind. Please describe where the event
takes place and what is happening.

Experiment 2
In the space below, please describe an academically relevant event involving you somewhere on
or near campus within the next week. This can be about anything, so long as it involves you on,
or close to, campus doing something related to your schooling. Just describe the first event that
comes to mind. Please describe where the event takes place and what is happening.
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